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Abstract
This Article highlights a flaw in the existing rules regarding
partnership tax allocations that has not yet received sufficient attention by
existing literature. Namely, the partnership tax allocation rules are implicitly
premised on the assumption that partners are unrelated and, thus, transact
with each other at arm's length. As a result, related partners can and do
devise tax allocation schemes that exploit the gap in the current partnership
tax allocation rules to achieve unwarranted tax savings.
This Article proposes to end this abuse by disallowing special
allocations among related partners. Under the proposal, allocations among
related partners would be required to be made on a strictly pro rata basis, in
accordance with the value of each related partner's interest in the
partnership. While this proposal would rationalize the existing partnership
tax allocation rules and prevent abusive related partnership allocations, it
would not have any detrimental effect on real economic transactions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The immensely complicated tax rules governing partnership
allocations-the notorious section 704(b) regulations-have been the subject
of criticism ever since their promulgation nearly 30 years ago. Yet, one
particular problem with those rules has thus far escaped significant scrutiny.
The problem involves partnership allocations that are shared by partners who
are related to one another. Because the section 704(b) regulations are
premised on the assumption that partners deal with each other at arm's
length, they are ill-suited to deal with related-partner allocations. As a result,
these regulations can easily be abused by related partners.
For instance, the recent surge in publicly-traded partnerships that are
exempt from corporate tax ("Exempt PTPs") may be attributable, at least in
part, to abusive related-partner allocations that are allowed under the section
704(b) regulations. Only publicly-traded partnerships that earn sufficient
passive-type income ("qualifying income") are Exempt PTPs; all other
publicly-traded partnerships are taxed as corporations. Traditionally, Exempt
PTPs were found only in certain narrow industries, such as real estate and
natural resources, which generated almost exclusively passive-type income
(as opposed to income earned in the ordinary course of a trade or business).
However, as the Wall Street Journal recently explained,' Exempt PTPs are
now being used in a host of nontraditional industries. Thus, for example,
1. John D. McKinnon, More Firms Enjoy Tax Free Status, WALL ST. J.,(Jan.) 10, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203733
504577026361246836488.
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private equity firms and even cemetery operators have been able to classify
themselves as Exempt PTPs.2
This new breed of Exempt PTPs is evidence of two distinct
problems. First, the existing partnership allocation rules suffer from a serious
flaw-namely, they cannot effectively police allocations among related
partners. As a result, related persons can easily exploit this shortcoming to
achieve outcomes that are unwarranted. For instance, the new Exempt PTPs
can rely on the existing section 704(b) regulations to easily "launder" their
nonqualifying income through an affiliated blocker corporation. Second, the
integrity of the corporate tax is under attack, as taxpayers who traditionally
would be subject to it increasingly find ways to avoid it. Each problem is
more pervasive than the Exempt PTP problem highlighted in the Wall Street
Journal, and each problem warrants attention in its own right. This Article
will focus mostly on the first problem-the easy ability to abuse related-
partner allocations under the current section 704(b) regulations-though it
will offer some preliminary thoughts on the second problem. As to the first
problem, existing literature contains limited discussion of the partnership tax
allocation rules' failure to effectively constrain allocations among related
partners, and, to the extent that the literature discusses this issue, it focuses
on assessing ways in which the IRS might challenge taxpayers under current
law.3 Given the limitations of the tools currently available to the IRS, this
Article, by contrast to existing literature, proposes reforms to close the
loophole in the current partnership tax allocation rules.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides examples that
illustrate how taxpayers can abuse related-partner allocations. Part III
explains the ineffectiveness of existing law in preventing this abuse. Part IV
proposes reforms to the partnership tax allocation rules to fix this problem. In
general, the proposal would require partnerships to allocate tax items among
related partners pro rata based on the relative value of each related partner's
equity interest in the partnership. Although the proposal will not necessarily
foreclose all opportunities for Exempt PTPs to expand beyond their
traditional scope, the proposed reforms would make it more difficult in some
cases for nontraditional businesses to reclassify as Exempt PTPs and,
perhaps more importantly, close a significant gap in the partnership tax
allocation rules that could easily be exploited by taxpayers for other myriad
purposes.
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Emily Cauble, Was Blackstone's Initial Public Offering Too
Good To Be True?: A Case Study in Closing Loopholes in the Partnership Tax
Allocation Rules, 14 FLA. TAX REv. 153 (2013); Richard M. Leder, Tax-Driven
Partnership Allocations with Economic Effect: The Overall After-Tax Present Value
Test for Substantiality and Other Considerations, 54 TAX LAW. 753, 769, 779-80
(2001) [hereinafter Leder, Tax-Driven Partnership Allocations].
4812014]
Florida Tax Review
II. EXAMPLES OF ABUSIVE RELATED-PARTNER ALLOCATIONS
While entities treated as partnerships for federal income tax purposes
("partnerships") are not themselves subject to tax, a partnership's items of
income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit ("tax items") flow through the
partnership and are allocated to its partners, who must include these tax items
on their own tax returns. A fundamental issue in partnership taxation is how
these tax items are allocated among partners. Because partners often have
different tax attributes, an allocation regime that is too permissive would
result in easy tax avoidance. For example, a partner with an expiring capital
loss carryover could be allocated all of the partnership's capital gains, which
would result in those gains going completely untaxed. To deal with this
problem, partnership tax regulations known as the section 704(b) regulations
created the substantial economic effect test. Allocations made by the
partnership agreement generally must satisfy this test to ensure that they will
be respected.
The substantial economic effect test is infamously lengthy, technical,
and complex. It has long been criticized as inscrutable, impossible-to-apply,
and ineffective. Yet, despite all of this criticism of the substantial economic
effect test, commentators have not focused much attention on one
particularly glaring problem.4 As we explain below, the test was designed
only with arm's length partners in mind, yet it appears to apply with equal
force to allocations among related partners. Because of this mismatch,
4. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
5. In the context of section 704(c), by contrast, the regulations do contain a
special rule that may apply when partners are related. In particular, the regulations
provide that, if a partnership uses the remedial allocation method and allocates
remedial items to one partner and offsetting remedial items to a related partner, the
contribution of property and allocation method may be inconsistent with the intent of
subchapter K. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(1). Furthermore, section 704(e) contains a special
rule that can, in some cases, affect allocations among related partners. In particular,
the special rules can apply if one partner (the "donor") provides a gift of a
partnership interest to another partner (the "donee"), directly or indirectly, such as by
giving the donee property which the donee, subsequently, contributes to the
partnership. In addition, the special rules apply if one family member sells a
partnership interest to another family member. When the special rules apply, the IRS
can re-allocate income among the affected partners if the allocations in the
partnership agreement do not adequately compensate these partners for the services
and capital they contribute. For further discussion, see William S. McKee, William
F. Nelson & Robert L. Whitmire, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS 1 15.05 (2014) [hereinafter McKEE ET AL., PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS]. The special rules, however, do not require reallocation of income among
family members who were not parties to a gift or sale of a partnership interest. Id.
Regarding allocations among family members in situations not covered by section
704(e), see id. ("[I]t is unclear whether the Service can reallocate partnership income
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testing related-party allocations for substantial economic effect proves to be
a pointless exercise. As a result, the section 704(b) regulations freely allow
taxpayers to use related-party allocations to obtain unwarranted tax benefits.
Before we discuss the section 704(b) regulations and their inability
to effectively police related-partner allocations, we will provide two
examples to illustrate how related-partner allocations can be used to derive
significant tax benefits. The first (the "CFC example") is based on an
example added to the section 704(b) regulations in 2008:
A, a domestic corporation, wholly owns corporations B and
C. B is a domestic corporation, while C is a foreign
corporation. A is the common parent of a consolidated group
(which includes B but not C, because C is a foreign
corporation) that files a consolidated tax return. B and C
form partnership BC by contributing equal value to the
partnership. Substantially all of BC's income is expected to
be foreign source income that will not be subpart F income.
The BC partnership agreement provides that, for the first
fifteen years, BC's gross income will be allocated 10 percent
to B and 90 percent to C, and BC's deductions and losses
will be allocated 90 percent to B and 10 percent to C. The
partnership agreement also provides that, after the initial
fifteen year period, BC's gross income will be allocated 90
percent to B and 10 percent to C, and BC's deductions will
be allocated 10 percent to B and 90 percent to C.7
among related persons who are admittedly partners . . . but who are not subject to
section 704(e)(2). Prior to the enactment of section 704(e), the Service argued on a
number of occasions that partnership income could be so reallocated. The courts
generally were reluctant to remake the partners' contract except in situations of clear
abuse. In general, it seems that family partners who are not subject to § 704(e)(2)
should have the same freedom to allocate partnership income among themselves as
unrelated partners. On the other hand, because of the lack of adversity that may exist
among family partners, allocations that are palpably unreasonable may be subject to
attack.").
6. This gap in the section 704(b) regulations has not gone unnoticed by the
Treasury and the IRS. In a 2008 preamble to an amendment to the section 704(b)
regulations, the Treasury and the IRS announced that they "continue to consider
issuing additional guidance addressing the proper treatment of special allocations of
items of a partnership that is owned primarily by related parties." T.D. 9398, 2008-
24 I.R.B. 1147.
7. See Reg. § 1.704-l(b)(5), Ex. 28.
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The CFC example is illustrated in Figure I below.
If effective, these special allocations will reduce the U.S. taxable
income of the consolidated group of which A is the common parent during
the initial fifteen year period. Gross income is shifted over to C, which does
not pay U.S. tax on that income because the income is foreign sourced (and
A does not pay tax currently on the income because it is not subpart F
income). Meanwhile, deductions are shifted over to B, which allows the
consolidated group to use those deductions to reduce its U.S. tax liability.
After the initial fifteen year period, the arrangement is designed to flip,
which in theory would increase the consolidated group's U.S. tax liability
after the flip. But, of course, the arrangement could be modified before that
occurs to mitigate this effect or, alternatively, the parties could enter into
another similar arrangement that would shelter the disproportionate net
income realized by the consolidated group beginning in Year 16. Regardless,
at a minimum, if this arrangement were respected, the allocations would
reduce the consolidated group's U.S. tax liability during the first fifteen years
as compared to the tax liability that the consolidated group would incur if
BC's income and deductions were simply allocated equally between B and C
in those years.
484 [Vol. 16:9
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It appears that, under current law, this arrangement would be
respected as long as the consolidated group satisfies two technical
conditions, both of which lack economic significance. First, the arrangement
must satisfy the requirements of section 482, which generally requires related
taxpayers to transact on arm's length terms. 8 After describing the facts, the
recently added CFC example concludes that the allocations under the
agreement may be reallocated under section 482.9 The example, however,
does not go on to explain how the section 482 issue would be analyzed. It
would appear that the critical issue under section 482 is whether the
respective partnership interests acquired by B and C were acquired on arm's
length terms. Thus, to comply with the section 482 standard, B's and C's
partnership interests presumably must be valued upon acquisition, and the
contributions that each makes to the partnership must have a value
commensurate with the value of their respective partnership interests. If B's
interest is worth more than C's or vice versa, then the parties' respective
contributions would have to account for that, or else section 482 would
operate to recast the arrangement on arm's length terms.'o
While the new section 704(b) example indicates that section 482
applies to the BC partnership, section 482 should not be much of an obstacle.
A merely has to ensure that, when the partnership is formed, the expected
value paid by B and C (in the form of current and future contributions of
property or services or both to the partnership) is commensurate with the
expected value to be received by each subsidiary (in the form of future
8. See infra Part III.B.
9. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), Ex. 28.
10. It is worth noting that the reallocation under section 482 is not
necessarily the only remedy available to the IRS in the case of disproportionate
contributions. For example, in the corporate context, constructive transactions would
apparently be used if contributions were not commensurate with expected
distributions. See Reg. § 1.35 1-l(b)(1) (explaining that disproportionate contribution
transactions may be recharacterized as gift or compensation transactions between
contributors); see also Rev. Rul. 76-454, 1976-2 C.B. 102 (applying Reg. § 1.351-
1(b)(1) to create a constructive distribution of stock in the case of disproportionate
contributions). However, while a partnership's tax items are allocated to its owners
under a pass-through regime, a corporation is a separate taxpaying entity-it is
subject to entity-level tax on its income and therefore does not allocate tax items to
its owners. Because corporations are separate taxpaying entities, the section 482
reallocation-of-tax-items remedy is not available in the corporate context, so the only
remedy for disproportionate allocations is to reconstruct the purported capital
contributions. On the other hand, in the partnership context, reallocations can be
utilized, and the section 704(b) regulations expressly contemplate the possibility of
reallocating partnership tax items using section 482. See Reg. §§ 1.704-l(b)(1)(iii), -
1(b)(5), Ex. 28. Accordingly, it does not appear that Regulation section 1.351-
1(b)(1)'s constructive transaction approach used in the corporate context is relevant
in the partnership context.
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nonliquidating and liquidating distributions) after appropriate discounting.
Thus, the section 482 issue is simply a pricing issue, which can be resolved
with appraisals. Satisfying section 482 might require that the subsidiaries
contribute amounts that are not equal (contrary to the facts of the example set
forth in the regulations). However, given the brother-sister relationship
between B and C, contributing different amounts of capital should not be
difficult to arrange. If either subsidiary lacked the requisite capital to make
the appropriate contributions, the subsidiary could receive a capital
contribution from the parent or borrow the capital from the parent or from
some other lender.
Second, the allocations would have to satisfy the section 704(b)
regulations' substantial economic effect test. This also should not be at all
difficult. As discussed below, the economic effect part of that test merely
requires the parties to maintain capital accounts in a specified manner and to
respect those capital accounts upon liquidation, two technical requirements
that, in the related party context, are easily satisfied. The substantiality prong
requires that one or more partners bear the risk that the allocation scheme
might harm that partner, after taking into account tax considerations. This
prong is also easily satisfied because it is surely possible that the aggregate
taxable income of the BC partnership might differ substantially between the
initial fifteen year period (in which C is allocated a disproportionate amount
of that taxable income) and the remaining life of the partnership (where B is
allocated a disproportionate amount of that taxable income). Thus, B bears
the risk that the initial period will be disproportionately profitable, while C
bears the risk that the subsequent period will be disproportionately profitable.
In the context of related partners, however, this risk-of-harm analysis is
meaningless. Whatever loss might be incurred by B will inure directly to the
benefit of C and vice versa. Because B and C are wholly owned by A, this is
akin to moving money from a person's left-hand pocket to her right-hand
pocket; it is a zero-sum game for A. For these reasons, the substantial
economic effect test will not even remotely deter A's tax-minimization
strategy.
Thus, it appears that BC's special allocations will be respected as
long as the parties comply with these technical, but completely
nonsubstantive conditions. This is true even though the allocations are
entirely tax motivated and even though tax-motivated allocations are the
precise target of the substantial economic effect test.
The second example (the "PTP example") of related party
allocations involves the use of so-called blocker structures to qualify
publicly-traded partnerships as Exempt PTPs. In general, blockers are shell
corporations that are, for tax purposes, interposed between a parent company
and an operating business. Blockers are used in many different situations,
some of which implicate the related-partner allocation issues discussed in
this Article and others that do not. One common use of blockers is to allow a
486 [Vol. 16:9
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publicly traded partnership to satisfy the income requirement in section
7704(c) so as to qualify as an Exempt PTP." To qualify as an Exempt PTP,
publicly traded partnerships cannot realize more than an insubstantial amount
of nonqualifying income.' 2 Qualifying income is generally passive-type
income, such as interest, rents, dividends, and capital gains.' 3
Traditional operating businesses usually expect to realize more than
an insubstantial amount of nonqualifying income, such as compensation for
services or other active business income. Historically, these businesses
would not attempt to qualify for Exempt PTP status, instead simply resigning
themselves to paying corporate tax on their income. However, as described
in the Wall Street Journal article mentioned in the Introduction, many
traditional businesses are now using blockers to qualify their parent company
as an Exempt PTP. Instead of realizing nonqualifying income directly, which
would preclude Exempt PTP status, the parent company instead can run the
nonqualifying income through the blocker, which reports that income on its
own corporate tax return and, after deducting expenses, pays corporate tax on
the net income.14 The blocker can thereafter distribute the nonqualifying
income (net of corporate taxes paid) up to the Exempt PTP parent as a
dividend, which is qualifying income. While nonqualifying income is run
through the blocker in this manner, qualifying income (i.e., interest, rents,
dividends, and capital gains) are realized directly by the Exempt PTP, which
means that these items are exempted from corporate tax.
Furthermore, to reduce the blocker's corporate tax liability, blockers
are often heavily leveraged using loans from the parent Exempt PTP, which
allows some of the nonqualifying income to be paid up to the parent as
deductible interest. The interest income realized by the parent constitutes
qualifying income. Thus, for example, a leveraged blocker that realizes
$100x of nonqualifying income might distribute $50x in the form of interest
paid on loans from the parent. If the loan qualifies as debt for tax purposes,
then the interest deduction reduces the blocker's taxable income to $50x.
Assuming a 40 percent corporate tax rate, the blocker could then, for
example, pay $30x of dividends (which is qualifying income) to the parent,
while $20x (i.e., 40% * $50x of taxable income) is paid in corporate tax. The
end result is that the blocker pays tax of $20x on the $1 00x of nonqualifying
income that it earns. Meanwhile all of the qualifying income received by the
PTP parent-$50x of interest paid by the blocker, $30x of dividends
11. Exempt PTPs can be treated as partnerships for tax purposes. I.R.C. §
7704(c). As such, they will not be subject to entity level tax. I.R.C. § 701.
12. I.R.C. § 7704(c).
13. I.R.C. § 7704(d).
14. In some cases, the blocker may not pay U.S. tax on the income. In
particular, the blocker may be formed outside the U.S. and, as a result, would
generally not pay U.S. tax on foreign source nonqualifying income allocated to it,
provided that such income was not effectively connected to a U.S. trade or business.
4872014]
Florida Tax Review
distributed by the blocker, and all of the PTP's income that is not run through
the blocker-is exempt from corporate tax.
To run its nonqualifying income through a blocker, the Exempt PTP
may set up a partnership between itself and its wholly owned blocker
corporation to operate the business. Qualifying income is allocated entirely
to the parent, while nonqualifying income is allocated entirely to the blocker.
This structure is shown in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2
15. The ability to deduct interest would be subject to certain limitations. For
example, if the blocker were too thinly capitalized, some of the debt could be recast
as equity for tax purposes. Likewise, if the parent charged an interest rate that was
higher than a market rate, the debt could be recast as equity for tax purposes.
Furthermore, section 163(j) could limit the amount of interest deductible by the
blocker if the owners of the Exempt PTP are not subject to tax on the interest.
488 [Vol. 16:9
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Due to the interrelatedness of the Exempt PTP Parent and the
Blocker, there is a risk of reallocation under section 482. However, as in the
CFC example, with appraisals (and, if necessary, intercompany transfers or
loans), section 482 will not be an obstacle. The parent simply must ensure
that the respective contributions by itself and the blocker are commensurate
in value with the distributions that each is expected to receive from the
partnership.
Likewise, the substantial economic effect test will not be difficult to
satisfy. So long as there is a reasonable chance that the amount of qualifying
income and nonqualifying income might fluctuate by more than an
insignificant amount, there would be the requisite possibility that one partner
might suffer from this arrangement, as compared to an arrangement in which
all tax items were allocated pro rata based on the partners' interests in the
partnership. To illustrate, assume that the nonqualifying income is expected
to equal 20 percent of the business's income, but could vary between 10
percent and 30 percent. Assume the blocker contributes 20 percent of the
partnership's capital, and the parent contributes 80 percent of the
partnership's capital. If the nonqualifying income turns out to be 10 percent,
then the blocker corporation would be worse off than it would have been had
it simply received a 20 percent allocation of all of the partnership's income
(in lieu of the actual allocation of 100 percent of the partnership's
nonqualifying income and none of the partnership's qualifying income). This
possibility that the blocker might be worse off would allow the arrangement
to pass the substantiality test. Nevertheless, this risk will not deter the parent
from using the blocker structure because whatever harm is done to its captive
blocker inures directly to the benefit of the parent, and whatever harm is
done to the parent inures to the benefit of its captive blocker.
Thus, in both examples, allocations that are wholly tax motivated
will be respected, even though the substantial economic effect test was
designed precisely to deter tax-driven allocations. The next section describes
this gap in the substantial economic effect test and other shortcomings of
existing law in more detail.
III. THE FAILURE OF EXISTING PARTNERSHIP TAX LAW
The partnership tax allocations used in the CFC example and the
PTP example are entirely tax-driven. The IRS has certain tools at its disposal
that could be used to combat tax-driven allocations. However, none of these
tools are adequate in preventing this abuse. This Part discusses the
instruments available to the IRS under current law and explains why they are
insufficient.
4892014]
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A. The Substantial Economic Effect Test
Because partners in a partnership can have widely disparate tax
attributes, allocations among partners can be abused. For instance, a
partnership could allocate all of its high-rate income to its tax-exempt or
low-tax-rate partners and all of its tax-exempt or low-rate income to its high-
tax-rate partners, which would result in a reduction of the partners' collective
tax liabilities. To inhibit this type of gaming, the section 704(b) regulations
generally require that a partnership agreement's allocations satisfy the
economic effect test and the substantiality test, which together comprise the
substantial economic effect test.
The economic effect test requires that the allocations be consistent
with the economic arrangement among the partners. This reduces the
partners' flexibility in making tax allocations because it requires the
allocations to be tethered to their economic deal.' 6 Pursuant to the economic
effect requirement, if the partnership allocates a $5 item of income to a
partner, the allocation must increase the partner's capital account by $5, and
this must increase that partner's right to liquidating distributions by $5.1
Proper capital accounting ensures that the partner is better off (in pre-tax
terms) by $5 than had she not been allocated the $5 item of income.' 8 By
requiring that allocations be consistent with the economic deal, the economic
effect test provides some friction against tax-motivated allocations. If a
partnership wishes to allocate $5 of income to a low-bracket partner or $5 of
loss to a high-bracket partner, the economic effect prong requires that those
allocations must affect capital accounts and that capital account balances
must determine the amount of liquidating distributions to each partner.
Nevertheless, because of the possibility of offsetting allocations, the
economic effect requirement is not, by itself, much of an obstacle to
engaging in tax-motivated allocations. If a partnership expects to receive
different characters of tax items or even different timing of same-character
tax items, the partnership could (consistent with the economic effect test)
still allocate the items in a tax-advantaged way while not changing the real,
overall economic deal.19 The partnership would do this by using offsetting
allocations.
16. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a).
17. See Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b). Liquidating distributions can be
negative, meaning that a partner with a negative capital account would be required to
contribute money to the partnership upon liquidation. See Reg. § 1.704-
1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(3).
18. However, the partner will not receive the additional $5 until a
liquidation occurs, which could be many years in the future. Thus, in present value
terms, the partner may not receive a benefit as large as $5.
19. See Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Special Allocations, 46
TAx L. REv. 1, 4 (1990) [hereinafter Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K] (explaining
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To illustrate, assume that there is a 50/50 partnership between X and
Y and that X is tax-exempt20 while Y is taxable. The partnership could
specially allocate the first $5 of its taxable income to X and the first $5 of its
tax-exempt income to Y, with all other items split evenly. Assuming that the
partnership earns at least $5 of taxable income and $5 of tax-exempt income,
X and Y are, from a pre-tax perspective, in the same economic position that
they would have occupied absent the special allocations. Nevertheless, they
have effected a partial sale of X's tax-exemption, which makes Y better off
(by exchanging $2.50 of taxable income for $2.50 of tax-free income), X no
worse off (because X is tax-exempt), and the government worse off (because
it is collecting less tax revenue from the partners collectively).2 1
The substantiality test is intended to inhibit this type of tax
planning.22 In operation, the substantiality prong does not prohibit outright
the effective selling of tax attributes through the use of partnership
allocations. Instead, to be respected, such a "sale" must be accompanied by
some degree of risk that the partners' original economic deal will be altered.
In particular, to satisfy the substantiality test, allocations in a partnership
agreement must overcome a number of obstacles, the most stringent of which
that partners could use special allocations to "shift gain and loss [to] take advantage
of tax rate differences between partners" and to "shift income, gain, or loss on assets
so that partners may take advantage of differences in their character.").
20. For example, X might have large amounts of net operating losses that it
expects would otherwise expire before being utilized.
21. X and Y are in the same pre-tax position because their capital accounts
will be the same after the special allocations as they were before. The critical fact in
this regard is that the partnership will realize at least $5 of each type of income.
22. See Terence Floyd Cuff, Proposed Regulations Try - Unsuccessfully -
to Fix a Broken Set of Substantiality Rules, 104 J. TAX'N 280, 282 (2006) ("The
after-tax filter of 'substantiality' in the Regulations represents an effort to objectify
what is an inherently subjective inquiry-whether the transaction is motivated by
business profit as opposed to tax profit."); Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K supra
note 19, at 14 (noting that substantiality "is essentially a rule against tax-driven
allocations"); GEORGE K. YIN & KAREN C. BURKE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 97
(2009) (noting that the "general intent [of the substantiality prong] is to ferret out
and invalidate allocations that allow taxpayers, operating through a partnership, to
achieve greater tax savings than had they simply operated on their own."); Andrea
Monroe, Too Big To Fail: The Problem of Partnership Allocations, 30 VA. TAX
REV. 465, 487 (2011); Gregg D. Polsky, Deterring Tax-Driven Partnership
Allocations, 64 TAX LAW. 97, 99 (2010) [hereinafter Polsky, Tax-Driven
Allocations] ("If a partnership expects to receive different types of income or gain,
or different types of deduction or loss, the partnership could-consistent with the
economic effect prong-still allocate the items in a tax-advantaged way while not
changing the real, overall economic deal. . . . The second prong of the substantial
economic effect test (substantiality) is intended to inhibit this type of tax planning.").
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is the overall tax effects test contained in Regulation section 1.704-
1(b)(2)(iii)(a) which provides:
[T]he economic effect of an allocation .. . is not substantial
if, at the time the allocation becomes part of the partnership
agreement, (1) the after-tax consequences of at ,least one
partner may, in present value terms, be enhanced compared
to such consequences if the allocation . . . were not
contained in the partnership agreement, and (2) there is a
strong likelihood that the after-tax consequences of no
partner will, in present value terms, be substantially
diminished compared to such consequences if the allocation
... were not contained in the partnership agreement. 2 3
More simply, a set of potentially offsetting allocations lacks
substantiality if it may make one partner better off (after tax) and is not likely
to make any partner substantially worse off (after tax), as compared to what
24would occur if the allocations were not in the partnership agreement.
Applying this test to the XY partnership example reveals that the
allocations lack substantiality. In applying the test, we compare what each
partner is likely to receive, as a result of the allocations, to what each partner
would have received if the partnership had allocated each type of income
23. Reg. § 1.704-l(b)(2)(iii)(a). There are other hurdles that an allocation
must overcome in order for the allocation to have substantiality. For example, the
allocation cannot be a "shifting allocation" and the allocation cannot be a "transitory
allocation." See Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(b), -1(b)(2)(iii)(c).
24. Regarding what occurs if the allocation were not in the partnership
agreement, the regulations instruct us to determine what would occur if everything
were allocated based on the Partners' Interests in the Partnership (PIP). Reg. §
1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a). PIP utilizes a facts and circumstances test. To determine PIP,
one must examine all the facts and circumstances that relate to the economic
arrangement of the partners (including but not limited to: the partners' relative
contributions to the partnership, the interests of the partners in economic profits and
losses, the interests of the partners in cash flow and other nonliquidating
distributions, and the rights of the partners to distributions of capital upon
liquidation). Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(3)(i) to -(ii). For further discussion of PIP, see
Bradley T. Borden, The Allure and Illusion of Partners' Interests in a Partnership,
79 U. CIN. L. REv. 1077 (2011). Furthermore, for purposes of determining PIP that is
used as a baseline for testing allocations for substantiality, we must ignore the
potentially suspect allocation that is being evaluated. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a)
("References in this paragraph (b)(2)(iii) to a comparison to consequences arising if
an allocation . . . were not contained in the partnership agreement mean that the
allocation . . . is determined in accordance with the partners' interests in the
partnership . . . disregarding the allocation ... being tested under this paragraph
(b)(2)(iii).") (emphasis added).
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equally to each partner.25 At the time the partners agree to specially allocate
the taxable and tax-exempt items, it appears that Y is definitely better off and
X definitely no worse off than if all items were allocated 50/50. The only
way that one partner might be worse off by virtue of the special allocations is
if there is a realistic possibility that both of the following conditions are
satisfied: (1) the partnership could realize less than $5 of taxable or tax-
exempt income and (2) the amounts of taxable and tax-exempt income could
differ. Otherwise, it is clear that no partner will be worse off and,
accordingly, the special allocations would lack substantiality.
By contrast, consider the facts of the following example. Assume
that, in the VW partnership, partner V is tax-exempt while partner W is
taxable. Each partner contributes an equal amount of capital to the
partnership. The partnership allocates its taxable income 90 percent to V and
10 percent to W and allocates its tax-exempt income 10 percent to V and 90
percent to W.
The allocations in this example will likely pass the substantiality test
because, at the time the partners agree to the allocations, there is a real risk
that one or the other partners would be worse off compared to a 50/50
allocation scheme. If the taxable income is sufficiently greater than the tax-
exempt income, then W is substantially worse off, and, if the tax-exempt
income is sufficiently greater than the taxable income, V suffers
substantially. The only way the allocations might not pass muster is if there
is a high degree of likelihood that the respective amounts of taxable income
and tax-exempt income recognized by the VW partnership will be
approximately equal. 2 6 In that case, V (the tax-exempt partner) would not be
substantially worse off, because it would be allocated approximately the
same amount as it would have been allocated absent the special allocation.
Meanwhile, W (the taxable partner) would be better off after taxes because it
will be allocated roughly the same amount as it would have otherwise been
allocated, but its allocations will be disproportionately comprised of tax-
exempt income.
When partners are transacting at arm's length, the economic effect
and substantiality rules are, at least in theory if not in practice, sensible. If
two arm's length partners want to use allocations to play tax games, then
they must take the risk that one partner might suffer a loss and the other
might receive a windfall. While it would be a zero-sum game between the
25. See supra note 24.
26. In fact, if, in retrospect, the amount of taxable income is very close to
the amount of tax-exempt income, the IRS could benefit from a presumption that the
allocation was a shifting allocation and therefore lacked substantiality. See Reg. §
1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(b). The taxpayers could, nevertheless, rebut this presumption by
showing that, at the time they agreed to the allocations, there was adequate risk that
the amounts of income could have been sufficiently different. Id.
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partners, the partners' original economic deal would be altered, and a partner
might refuse to play the game because of the risk that it might end up the
loser. Thus, in the VW partnership example, for instance, given that the
special allocations create significant risk for the parties, they may be
unwilling to go along with them if the only goal of the allocations is to
reduce taxes. And, by implication, if V and W do agree to the special
allocations notwithstanding this significant risk, the allocations might serve
some goal other than mere tax avoidance. Perhaps, for instance, V is
primarily responsible for selecting investments that generate taxable income,
W is primarily responsible for selecting investments that generate tax-exempt
income, and the special allocations are designed to incentivize each party to
select investments wisely. While this line of reasoning can be and has been
critiqued on a number of different grounds,2 7 it is not patently absurd.
On the other hand, when partners are closely related, these rules are
completely nonsensical. The rationale behind the rules is premised on
economic tension between partners, though this is never stated explicitly. For
tax-motivated allocations to be respected, there must be the risk that one
partner might be worse off (and, by implication, the other partners better off).
But, in the context of related partners, the partners are effectively different
pockets of the same taxpayer. Therefore, the risk of making one partner
worse off will not result in any deterrent effect because the other related
partner(s) would always receive an equal and offsetting windfall. In the VW
partnership example, for instance, if V and W were wholly-owned
subsidiaries of a common parent, the fact that the allocations might make W
worse off after tax (to the benefit of V) would provide no assurance that the
allocations were not entirely tax-motivated.
This analysis proves two points. First, the substantial economic
effect test will not deter tax-motivated allocations among related partners.
Second, because the substantial economic effect test is premised on
economic tension among partners, it is clear that the drafters of the section
704(b) regulations did not have related-partner allocations in mind when they
wrote those rules.
B. Section 482
Section 482 deals broadly with the ubiquitous problems arising from
the fact that related parties do not negotiate at arm's length. Accordingly,
27. For a discussion of the theoretical deficiencies of the substantiality test,
see Polsky, Tax-Driven Allocations, supra note 22. For discussion of substantiality's
practical shortcomings and other flaws, see, for example, Gergen, Reforming
Subchapter K, supra note 19; Calvin H. Johnson, Partnership Allocations from
Nickel-on-the-Dollar Substance, 134 TAX NOTES 873 (Feb. 13, 2012); Leder, Tax-
Driven Partnership Allocations, supra note 3.
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related parties might transact with each other in artificial ways purely to
minimize aggregate tax liability. Section 482 provides:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or
businesses (whether or not incorporated, whether or not
organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated)
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same
interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate
gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or
among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or
allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or
clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations,
trades, or businesses.2 8
In the context of partnership tax allocations, the regulations
explicitly note that the IRS may use section 482 to challenge partnership tax
allocations when partners are related.29 In particular, Regulation section
1.704-1(b)(1)(iii) states: "[A]n allocation that is respected under [the
substantial economic effect rules] nevertheless may be reallocated under
other provisions, such as section 482 . . . ."30 This language is supplemented
by Example 28 (similar to the CFC example described above), which
concludes that the special allocations "may be" reallocated under section
482.
Section 482 will not, however, be effective in dealing with the
problem of abusive related-partner allocations. As long as the amounts and
types of income earned by a partnership are sufficiently variable, the
partnership can easily comply with both section 482 and the substantial
economic effect rules.
28. I.R.C. § 482
29. For further discussion, see Leder, Tax-Driven Partnership Allocations,
supra note 3, at 785-87; McKEE ET AL., PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS, supra note
5, at 3.07[4] ("While there is limited case law dealing with the application of § 482
to partnerships, the courts have not been reluctant to apply it to situations where
partners are related or are under common control.. . . The scope of § 482 is broad
enough to encompass . . . partnerships between corporations and their controlling
shareholders, . . . assuming the controlling shareholders are viewed as
'organizations, trades or businesses' for purposes of § 482 . . . ."); id. at 11.03[3]
("[A]n allocation provision, which is in substance a contract among the partners as to
how they will share the partnership's income and loss, can distort the income of the
partners vis-d-vis each other. Accordingly, § 482 should apply to permit the Service
to correct such distortions where certain partners are under common control.").
30. Reg. § 1.704-l(b)(1)(iii).
31. See Reg. § 1.704-l(b)(5), Ex. 28; supra text accompanying note 9.
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To illustrate, consider again the facts of the PTP example and
assume that nonqualifying income is expected to equal 20 percent of the
business's total income, but could vary between 10 percent and 30 percent.
To avoid challenge under section 482, it appears that the partnership interests
acquired by the blocker and the Exempt PTP Parent simply must be acquired
on arm's length terms. 32 Thus, in this example, to comply with section 482,
the blocker might contribute 20 percent of the partnership's capital and the
parent might contribute 80 percent of the partnership's capital to match the
distributions each partner expects to receive. If the blocker does not own
enough capital to make the 20 percent capital contribution, then the parent
could contribute or lend additional capital to the blocker to allow it to make
the requisite contribution.
This structure would also pass muster under the substantial economic
effect test because there is sufficient risk that the blocker will be
substantially worse off than if all income items were simply allocated on a
20/80 basis, as opposed to allocating all of the nonqualifying income to the
blocker and all of the qualifying income to the parent. The blocker bears the
risk that the amount of nonqualifying income might be as low as 10 percent
of the total income.33
32. See Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) ("[T]he standard to be applied in every case is
that of a taxpayer dealing at arm's length with an uncontrolled taxpayer.").
33. If the types of income earned by a partnership are not sufficiently
variable, simultaneous compliance with section 482 and the substantial economic
effect rules presents a greater challenge. For instance, consider again the facts of the
PTP example but assume the nonqualifying income could vary between 18 percent
and 22 percent of the business's income. In order to guard against challenge under
section 482, the Blocker and the Exempt PTP Parent would still contribute 20
percent and 80 percent of the partnership's capital, respectively. However,
contributing capital in these amounts could leave the partners vulnerable to challenge
under the substantial economic effect rules. To bolster their chances of passing the
substantiality test, the partners may be inclined to require the Blocker to contribute
more than 20 percent of total capital so that the allocations would have greater
potential to make the Blocker worse off, after tax, relative to the after tax
consequences that would result from allocating all income pro rata based on the
partners' interests in the partnership. However, if the Blocker contributes greater
than 20 percent of total capital while expecting to receive (on an average) only 20
percent of the future distributions, then the partners are more susceptible to challenge
under section 482. Moreover, even if the amounts of income earned by a partnership
are quite variable, partners may be concerned that, if the partnership indeed earns the
amounts and types of income they predict and if they have contributed capital based
on the expected future income to guard against challenge under section 482, the IRS
could benefit from a presumption that the allocations are shifting allocations and
therefore lack substantiality. However, the partners should be able to rebut the
presumption by showing that the amounts of income could have been quite different.
See supra note 26. Furthermore, although there is no formal presumption in the case
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C. Reading More Into Substantiality
When applying the substantiality test, the section 704(b) regulations
direct us to take into account "the interaction of an allocation with [a]
partner's tax attributes that are unrelated to the partnership."34 In a 1993 field
service advisory, the IRS suggested obliquely that a partner's "tax attributes"
could include the fact that the partner is related to another partner.35 This
approach has apparently not gained any traction over the past 20 years, but it
could conceivably address the problem identified in this Article. Presumably,
under such an approach, if the amount by which an allocation scheme might
make one partner worse off inured entirely to the benefit of a related partner,
the partnership could not rely on the fact that the allocation scheme might
harm the first partner in order to establish that the allocations pass the
substantiality test. In other words, the approach would allow the IRS to
combine the economic consequences of related partners to determine
whether the combination of partners could suffer a substantial economic
detriment.
Reading "tax attributes" expansively in this manner is a tempting
approach to closing an unintended gap in the section 704(b) regulations.
However, the IRS or courts might determine that the approach is foreclosed
by the literal language of the regulations. After all, the regulations refer to a
partner's "tax attributes"-not a partner's "attributes." Furthermore, the
regulations provide some examples of tax attributes that are taken into
account, such as a taxpayer's marginal tax rate, net operating loss
carryforward," and foreign taxpayer status. Thus, "tax attributes" appears to
refer to tax-specific attributes of a partner, not to a partner's economic
relationship with other partners.
Furthermore, this expansive interpretation of "tax attributes" would
effectively mean that allocations in an entirely captive partnership (i.e., a
partnership where all of the partners are related) would apparently never pass
of the overall tax effects test, as a practical matter, the test might be applied as if
there were such a presumption. See Polsky, Tax-Driven Allocations, supra note 22,
at 113. Nevertheless, in many cases, the amounts and types of potential income
earned by a partnership will vary sufficiently so that the partnership can easily pass
the substantiality test and withstand challenge under section 482.
34. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a).
35. See F.S.A. (Sept. 10, 1993), 1993 WL 1469410 ("Given the present
facts, it is important to examine the economic relationship of the partners of the
Partnership. While the substantiality regulations do not specifically address the issue
of related partners, section 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a) does require the Service to consider
each partner's tax attributes.") For further discussion of this possibility, see Leder,
Tax-Driven Partnership Allocations, supra note 3, at 779.
36. See, e.g., Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), Ex. 5.
37. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5), Ex. 9.
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muster under the substantial economic effect test. These allocations would
not have substantial economic effect because, once you combine the related
partners in a captive partnership, there is only one partner, so there is no
partner who could be made worse off. In other words, once you consider
relatedness in a -captive partnership, it will be a foregone conclusion that
allocations are simply shifting amounts from one pocket to another of a
single taxpayer to obtain better tax results.
This effect of reading "tax attributes" expansively-that is, that
captive partnership allocations will almost never have substantial economic
effect due to the overlapping interests of the related partners-is problematic
for two reasons. First, if the regulation's drafters had intended for this result,
presumably they would have simply said that captive partnership allocations
lack substantial economic effect rather than relying on a strained
interpretation of "tax attributes" to get there. Second, it is not at all clear how
related party allocations would be reallocated according to the partners'
interest in the partnership ("PIP"), which is the consequence of failing the
substantial economic effect test.38 The PIP test requires that tax items must
be allocated in accordance with the economic arrangement of the partners,
and, to determine the partners' economic arrangement, one must examine all
relevant facts and circumstances. The PIP test specifically identifies some
relevant economic facts and circumstances-the partners' relative
contributions to the partnership, the interests of the partners in economic
profits and losses, the interests of the partners in cash flow and other
nonliquidating distributions, and the rights of the partners to distributions of
capital upon liquidation-but acknowledges that there may be other relevant
facts and circumstances.39 If relatedness of the parties is a relevant "tax
attribute" in applying the substantial economic effect test, then presumably
that factor is relevant to the PIP analysis. And once relatedness is taken into
account under PIP, the related partners would presumably be collapsed
together in applying that test. The end result then is that there really is no
partnership, 40 just multiple pockets of a single taxpayer, which makes the PIP
test impossible to apply. While it is possible that the related parties could be
"looked through" for purposes of substantiality while still respected as
separate for purposes of the PIP analysis, such an approach would be bizarre
because allocations under PIP are supposed to be based on the real-world
economics of the partners' sharing arrangement. If related partners are
treated effectively as one partner for purposes of the substantiality safe
38. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(i).
39. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(3)(i) to -(ii).
40. If there is at least one nonrelated partner, then there would still be a
partnership, but the related partners would be collapsed together into a single partner
with multiple pockets.
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harbor because they are really a single economic unit, it is difficult to
understand how they could be respected as separate under PIP.
In summary, while interpreting "tax attributes" expansively might
have superficial appeal as an instrument to attack abusive related party
allocations, it seems to stretch the language too far. It would also throw all
related party allocations into the highly uncertain PIP test. And it is
extremely unclear how that test, which is based on the real economic deal
between partners, would apply to reallocate items among partners that are
merely components of a single economic unit.
D. The Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule
In May 1994, the Treasury proposed regulations known as the
"Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule" in response to the increasing prevalence of
abusive partnership transactions. 4 1 The proposed regulations provoked
intense criticism from practitioners.4 2 They complained that the regulations
were overly vague and beyond the scope of the Treasury's rulemaking
authority.43 Partially in response to criticisms, Treasury revised the
regulations to include additional examples and a list of factors that may be
relevant in determining whether or not a transaction is abusive.4 Yet, despite
the revisions made by Treasury, practitioners continue to criticize the
regulations.4 5
41. For the Proposed Regulation, see Prop. Reg. § 1.701-2, 59 Fed. Reg.
25,581 (1994). For discussion of the events prompting the proposed regulation, see,
for example, Andrea Monroe, What's in a Name: Can the Partnership Anti-Abuse
Rule Really Stop Partnership Tax Abuse?, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401, 408-13
(2010) [hereinafter Monroe, What's in a Name].
42. See, e.g., Monroe, What's in a Name, supra note 41, at 407.
43. See, e.g., Monroe, What's in a Name, supra note 41, at 416-24.
Although most practitioners criticized the proposed regulations, some scholars and
practitioners supported the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule. Id.
44. See, e.g., Monroe, What's in a Name, supra note 41, at 426 ("[T]he
Treasury did revise the [Partnership Anti-Abuse Regulation], presumably to mollify
the regulation's critics.").
45. See, e.g., Sheldon 1. Banoff, Anatomy of an Anti-Abuse Rule: What's
Really Wrong with Reg. Section 1.701-2, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 56-84 (Mar. 22,
1995); Richard M. Lipton, The Partnership Anti-Abuse Regs Revisited: Is There
Calm After the Storm?, 83 J. TAX'N. 68, 68 (1995); McKEE ET AL., PARTNERSHIPS
AND PARTNERS, supra note 5, at 1.05[5][a] (concluding that the Partnership Anti-
Abuse Rule is invalid under a Chevron analysis); Monroe, What's in a Name, supra
note 41, at 436; Lee Sheppard, Government Officials Discuss Partnership, Shelter
Issues, 2007 TAX NOTES TODAY 107-1 (June 4, 2007) (mentioning that practitioners
think the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule is invalid); Sheryl Stratton, They're Back ...
Washington Lawyers Attack Anti-Abuse Rules, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 178-4 (Sept.
12, 1995). However, for an argument that the anti-abuse rules are necessary and also
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As finally adopted, the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule provides:
[I]f a partnership is formed or availed of in
connection with a transaction a principal purpose of which is
to reduce substantially the present value of the partners'
aggregate federal tax liability in a manner that is inconsistent
with the intent of [the partnership tax rules], the
Commissioner can recast the transaction for federal tax
purposes, as appropriate to achieve tax results that are
consistent with the intent of [the partnership tax rules].4 6
The regulations further provide that, in order to determine whether a
partnership was formed or availed of for such a prohibited purpose, the IRS
must consider all relevant facts and circumstances. 47 Furthermore, the
regulations contain a list of factors that may indicate, but do not necessarily
48establish, that a partnership was used for a prohibited purpose. These
factors include, among others: (1) whether the present value of the partners'
aggregate tax liability is substantially less than the tax liability the partners
would incur if they engaged in the partnership's activities and owned the
partnership's assets directly;49 (2) whether substantially all of the partners are
related to one another,50 and (3) whether partnership items are allocated in
compliance with the literal language of the substantial economic effect rules
but with results that are inconsistent with the purpose of those rules.5 '
These three factors appear to cover the CFC example and the PTP
example. Regarding the first factor, in the case of the CFC example, if B and
C directly owned the underlying assets of the BC partnership, B would earn
more income (and benefit from fewer deductions) in the first 15 years, and
the present value of the consolidated group's and C's aggregate U.S. tax
liability could increase. In the PTP example, if the Exempt PTP Parent and
the Blocker directly owned what they own through the partnership, the
Exempt PTP Parent would earn more nonqualifying income. As a result, the
Exempt PTP Parent could fail to qualify as an Exempt PTP. This failure
would subject the Exempt PTP Parent to corporate level tax on its qualifying
income. Thus, the partnership structure used in the PTP example
substantially reduces the partners' aggregate tax liability.
valid under a Chevron analysis, see, for example, Noel B. Cunninghan & James R.
Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REv. 1, 39-62 (2004).
46. Reg. § 1.701-2(b).
47. Reg. § 1.701-2(c).
48. Id.
49. Reg. § 1.701-2(c)(1).
50. Reg. § 1.701-2(c)(4).
51. Reg. § 1.701-2(c)(5).
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With respect to the second factor, all of the partners are related given
that, in the CFC example, the two partners are wholly-owned subsidiaries of
a common parent and, in the PTP example, one partner is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the other partner. Regarding the third factor, in both cases, the
partnership's allocations comply with the literal language of the substantial
economic effect rules, 52 yet, the allocations are inconsistent with the purpose
of those rules because the allocations are entirely tax-motivated. 53
If the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule applies, the IRS could seek a
number of remedies including re-allocating items allocated by the
partnership or disregarding the partnership entirely.54 Thus, application of the
Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule could remedy the problem of abusive related-
partner allocations.
Nevertheless, we are not confident that the Partnership Anti-Abuse
Rule will suffice. First, because it is a general standard, as opposed to a
technical rule, there will be significant litigation risk if the IRS were to
challenge related-partner allocations by relying on the Partnership Anti-
Abuse Rule. Although the IRS could persuasively argue that the three factors
discussed above are implicated, this does not conclusively establish that the
Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule applies.55 And, particularly in light of its
contentious history, a judge may hesitate to rely on the Partnership Anti-
Abuse Rule given that partnership allocations are covered by the extremely
detailed rules in the section 704(b) regulations. Second, given the intensely
fact-specific nature of the rule, application of the Partnership Anti-Abuse
rule in particular cases will not necessarily prevent widespread use of
related-partner allocations. Taxpayers who use related-partner allocations
could argue that their facts are materially different and force the IRS to play
the "whack-a-mole" game in litigation. Therefore, even though we believe
that the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule generally applies to related-partner
allocations, we believe that a specific and prophylactic rule nevertheless
would still be useful.
52. See supra Part III.A.
53. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (observing that the purpose of
the substantiality test is to prevent overly tax-motivated allocations).
54. Reg. §§ 1.701-2(b)(4), -2(b)(1). Instead of relying on the Partnership
Anti-Abuse Rule to argue that the partnership should be disregarded, the IRS could
contend that a supposed partnership among related parties is not, in reality, a
partnership at all, based on more general substance over form principles. Like an
argument based on the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule, this argument is vulnerable to
litigation risks because a court may not be receptive to an argument based on
substance over form principles.
55. Reg. § 1.701-2(c).
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IV. PROPOSED REFORM: DISALLOWING SPECIAL ALLOCATIONS
AMONG RELATED PARTNERS
A. The Proposal
To close the unintended gap in existing law, the section 704(b)
regulations should be revised to disallow special allocations among related
partners. In particular, allocations between related partners should be deemed
to automatically fail the substantial economic test, and the PIP test (which
governs how tax items are allocated when the substantial economic effect
test is not satisfied) should be revised to require that these allocations be
made on a pro rata basis in accordance with the respective value of each
related partner's equity interest in the partnership. For this purpose, partners
would be "related" whenever they had a relationship that sufficiently
interfered with arm's length bargaining.
The relatedness definition could be borrowed from an existing Code
provision (or a combination of existing provisions) such as section 267 and
section 707(b). 56 To trigger the rule, the relatedness threshold should be less
than 100 percent. This is because the tax benefits of avoiding relatedness will
often outweigh the nontax costs of inserting a de minimis unrelated
"accommodation party" into the deal. To prevent circumvention via
accommodation parties, other related party rules in the tax law typically use
the 80 percent relatedness threshold, and it probably makes sense to use the
same threshold in this context.
It is important to emphasize that, while the degree of relatedness
between partners is significant, the aggregate ownership interest percentages
of related partners in a given partnership is not at all important. For example,
assume that X is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Y, X and Y own interests in a
partnership equal to 15 percent and 10 percent, respectively, of the
partnership's total equity, and the remaining 75 percent of partnership equity
is owned by unrelated partners. Under our proposal, special allocations
between X and Y would be disallowed and re-allocated pro rata between
them. The fact that X and Y do not collectively own a majority or controlling
56. Adopting a precise definition of relatedness does create a risk that
taxpayers will use the clear definition as a roadmap for designing transactions that do
not fall within the scope of the proposed rules. In order to mitigate this risk, the
relatedness definition could be accompanied by attribution rules that treat taxpayers
as owning interests in a partnership owned by related taxpayers. The attribution rules
could be similar to the attribution rules contained in section 267(c) or similar to even
broader attribution rules contained elsewhere in the Code. Alternatively, instead of
adopting a precise definition of relatedness, the proposed reform could rely on a
general standard-such as the standard in section 482. This would be more difficult
for taxpayers to avoid through tax structuring, but it would, at the same time, be
more difficult for taxpayers to apply and for the IRS to administer.
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interest in the partnership does not make the allocations between them any
less problematic; the critical fact is that there is no arm's length bargaining
between X and Y.57
The specific mechanics of our proposal are as follows. If all of the
partners in a partnership are related to each other, then all of the
partnership's tax items will be allocated among the partners pro rata based on
the value of their respective equity interests in the partnership.58 While
valuation of the interests might appear unduly onerous, recall that to pass
muster under section 482, each related partner's actual and expected
contributions of capital and services must be proven to be commensurate
with the respective value of the partner's equity interest.59 This means that
the respective values of the related partners' equity interests must already be
determined under existing law. Therefore, taxpayers and the IRS would incur
no additional administrative burden in applying this rule.
If only some of the partners are related to each other, the proposal
would require two steps. First, the allocations among the members of the
- 57. One might believe that the fact that X and Y do not collectively own a
majority or controlling interest is relevant because, without such an interest, they
have less of an ability to influence the partnership agreement and the resulting
partnership tax allocations. For example, the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule includes
captive partnerships as a factor suggesting abusiveness, but the existence of related
minority partners is not a factor. See Reg. § 1.701-2(c)(4) (listing as a factor
indicative of abusiveness: whether "substantially all" of the partners are related to
one another). However, because the allocations between X and Y do not affect the
other partners in the partnership, those partners may readily agree to special
allocations between X and Y, or X and Y might enter into a side agreement
providing for special allocations between themselves.
58. Special allocations can be of the "shifting" variety or the "transitory"
variety. Shifting allocations involve allocations that offset in a single taxable year,
while transitory allocations offset over multiple tax years. In each case, the
reallocation rule proposed above would reallocate the allocations pro rata in
accordance with the value of each related partner's equity interest in the partnership.
Thus, if two related partners own the partnership interests of identical value, but
partner X is allocated all of the net capital gains in Year I and partner Y is allocated
all of the net ordinary income in that year, then each partner would be allocated half
of each character of income in Year 1. If, instead, partner X is allocated all of the net
income in year 1, and partner Y is allocated all of the net income in year 2 and if the
amount of income expected to be earned in each year is such that the partnership
interests have identical value, then each partner will be allocated half of the net
income in each year. The reallocation in both cases is made in accordance with the
value of each partner's equity interest in the partnership.
59. If the proposed reforms utilized a definition of "related" partner that
was broad enough to encompass family members, the relative contributions by those
partners would be tested under section 704(e) (if it applied given the particular facts
involved), or, if section 704(e) did not apply, the relative contributions could be
tested under similar principles that could be incorporated into the proposed reforms.
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related partner group must be determined. These must be made on a pro rata
basis, so that each related partner receives a pro rata "slice" of all items of
the partnership's income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit that are allocated to
the related partner group. The size of each related partner's slice is based on
the respective value of that partner's interest in the partnership relative to the
entire related partner group's interest. (Again, because the relative value of
each related partner's interest is required under section 482, there is no
marginal administrative burden resulting from this first step.) Second, the
partnership's allocations would be tested under the regular substantial
economic effect test, but, for purposes of this test, partners who are related to
each other would be grouped together and treated as one partner. 6 0 For
example, when testing whether the allocations make partners better or worse
off after tax for substantiality purposes, the effect on a related partner is not
examined separately-rather the relevant inquiry is whether the related
partner group as a whole is made better or worse off.6 1
The following examples demonstrate the parameters of the proposal
and its effects:
Example 1. C owns 100% of each of two corporations-D
and E. D and E hold the only equity interests in a partnership
and the value of each of their interests is equal. This
ownership structure is shown in Figure 3 below. D and E
each contribute equal value to the partnership; therefore, the
arrangement passes muster under section 482. The
partnership earns $300 of taxable income and $200 of tax-
exempt income. As a result of the proposed reform, the
partnership could not allocate any item of income between D
and E in a way that differed from their relative equity
interests. Thus, the partnership must allocate to each partner
$150 of taxable income and $100 of tax-exempt income.
60. If the allocations failed the substantial economic effect test, then items
of the partnership would be reallocated in two steps. First, items would be
reallocated based on the regular PIP test, but, for purposes of this test, partners who
are related to each other would be grouped together and treated as one partner.
Second, any item that was reallocated to the related partner group would be allocated
within that group among the members pro rata based on the relative value of the
related partners' interests in the partnership.
61. Furthermore, when measuring the after-tax consequences of the
allocation of an item to the related partner group, one would assume that the item
was allocated among the members of that group in the manner required by step one
(in other words, pro rata based on the relative value of the related partners' interests
in the partnership).
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Figure 3
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Example 2. C owns 100 percent of each of two
corporations-D and E. D and E each hold a 25 percent
equity interest (by value) in a partnership. A, an unrelated
partner, owns a 50 percent equity interest (by value) in the
partnership. This ownership structure is shown in Figure 4
below. Because D and E each contribute equal value to the
partnership, section 482 is satisfied. The partnership earns
$300 of taxable income and $200 of tax-exempt income.
Under step one, any item that is allocated to D and E, as a
group, must be allocated equally between D and E. Under
step two, as long as doing so would be respected under the
existing section 704(b) regulations while treating D and E as
one partner, the partnership could allocate to A amounts that
differed from 50 percent of taxable income and 50 percent of
tax-exempt income, and to D and E (as a group), amounts
that differed from 50 percent of each type of income. Thus,
if consistent with step two, the partnership allocated to A
$100 of taxable and $50 of tax-exempt income, the
remaining $200 of taxable income must be allocated $100 to
each of D and E, and the remaining $150 of tax-exempt
income must be allocated $75 to each of D and E.
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Example 3. Assume the facts of the CFC example. If B's
and C's partnership interests have equal value, then the
partnership must allocate to each of B and C 50 percent of
each of the partnership's tax items in each year. (Section 482
would also require that B's and C's capital contributions be
equal.)
Example 4. Assume the facts of the PTP example. If the
Blocker's partnership interest is worth 20 percent of the total
partnership's equity and the Exempt PTP Parent's
partnership interest is worth the remaining 80 percent, then
the partnership must allocate to the Blocker 20 percent of
each tax item (regardless of whether the item represents
qualifying income or nonqualifying income), and the
partnership must allocate to the Exempt PTP Parent the
remaining 80 percent of each tax item.
B. Justifying the Proposal
The proposed reforms are consistent with any legitimate rationale for
allowing partnerships to use special allocations. Many criticize the ability to
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use special allocations even among unrelated partners.6 2 Given some of the
problematic uses of special allocations by unrelated partners, those criticisms
are understandable. Yet, while special allocations among unrelated partners
may be used abusively, they are even more susceptible to abuse by related
parties. Furthermore, although special allocations among unrelated partners
may, in some cases, serve nontax purposes by shifting risk and reward
among independent economic actors, they perform no such legitimate
function among related partners, who represent a single economic unit. The
traditional rationale justifying special allocations is that they provide the
necessary flexibility to allow partners to implement their business deal.64 For
example, if one partner is responsible for managing a particular asset,
allocating disproportionate amounts of income or loss from that asset to the
partner could provide an extra incentive for the partner to manage the asset
well. Alternatively, the business deal could simply be that one partner is to
bear disproportionate risk and reward from a particular asset or activity of
the partnership, and special allocations implement that economic
arrangement.
However, these rationales do not justify allowing flexibility among
related partners because these partners represent a single economic unit. A
partner who is responsible for managing a particular asset may be better
motivated to manage it well if income or loss from that asset is allocated
towards that partner and away from an unrelated partner. However, if both
partners are sufficiently related so that they are indifferent regarding how
they share economic gains or losses from the asset, disproportionate
allocations motivate the partner in charge of managing the asset no better
than proportionate allocations. 5 Likewise, a "business deal" that shifts risk
62. See, e.g., Curtis J. Berger, W(h)ither Partnership Taxation, 47 TAX L.
REv. 105, 108-09, 127-28 (1991) [hereinafter Berger, W(h)ither Partnership];
Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K, supra note 19; David Hasen, Partnership Special
Allocations Revisited, 13 FLA. TAX REv. 349 (2012) [hereinafter Hasen, Allocations
Revisited]; Jeffrey L. Kwall, Taxing Private Enterprise in the New Millennium, 51
TAX LAw. 229, 243-44, 251 (1998); Philip F. Postlewaite, Thomas E. Dutton &
Kurt R. Magette, A Critique of the ALI's Federal Income Tax Project - Subchapter
K: Proposals on the Taxation ofPartners, 75 GEO. L. J. 423, 493-94 (1986).
63. We refer to "single economic unit" even though we acknowledge that
the proposal would need to cover less than 100 percent economic overlap to preclude
the use of accommodation partners to circumvent the proposal.
64. See, e.g., Berger, W(h)ither Partnership, supra note 62 at 131-32;
Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K, supra note 19 at 33-34 ("Three sorts of arguments
have been made for special allocations. . . . [One] argument is that the flexibility of
special allocations is essential because of the infinite variety of business
structures."); Walter D. Schwidetzky, The Partnership Allocation Rules of Section
704(b): To Be or Not to Be, 17 VA. TAX REv. 707, 724-26 (1998).
65. One might argue that, while the economic unit might not care how items
are allocated between its subsidiary units, the managers of the subsidiary units might
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and reward between two or more parties that are effectively a single
economic unit is illusory; the deal has no more substance than a deal that
shifts risk from a person's left pocket to her right pocket.
In summary, if partners are sufficiently related, they are indifferent
as to how they share overall economic gains and losses. If they are
indifferent, they have no need for flexibility in sharing those items. And, if
flexibility is unnecessary, then there is no legitimate justification for special
allocations and, one can infer, the only purpose of those allocations is to
reduce taxes.
C. Potential Restructuring in Reaction to Proposed Reform
This Subpart will consider how taxpayers might restructure their
related partner transactions if the proposed reforms were enacted.66 Some
taxpayers are using special allocations to achieve beneficial tax results that
they could have otherwise achieved without the use of a partnership,
although using the partnership is likely somewhat more efficient than the
alternative. In some cases, if our proposal were adopted, these taxpayers
could be expected to shift to the nonpartnership structure. Nevertheless, the
care deeply because, for example, their bonuses might be based on their unit's
profitability. But even this does not justify flexibility in making allocations because
compensation arrangements can be based on metrics other than a unit's taxable
income. In other words, in determining entitlements to bonuses, the profit or loss of
a unit can be calculated in any manner the parties choose.
66. If the proposed reform was enacted, there might be a concern that
taxpayers could set up tiered partnership structures to circumvent the new rule. For
instance, in the PTP example, a taxpayer might consider using a structure in which
two partnerships-PI and P2-were partners in a third partnership ("Lower-Tier
Partnership"). Lower-Tier Partnership would allocate all qualifying income to P1
and all nonqualifying income to P2. The partners of P1 would be the PTP and
unrelated third parties that owned small interests. The partners of P2 would be a
blocker (wholly-owned by the PTP) and unrelated third parties that owned small
interests. P1 and P2 would each allocate tax items pro rata among their partners
based on the value of each partner's equity interest in P1 or P2. However, as long as
the definition of relatedness is sufficiently broad, this structure would not
successfully circumvent the proposed reform. For instance, if the definition of
relatedness covered partners who were related under section 707(b)(1)(B), P1 and P2
would be considered related given that the same persons own, directly or indirectly,
more than 50 percent of PI and P2 (or more than 80 percent, if an 80 percent
threshold is adopted). In particular, once constructive ownership is taken into
account (as directed by section 707(b)(3)'s instruction to apply section 267(c)), the
PTP owns more than 50 percent of P1 and more than 50 percent of P2 (or more than
80 percent, if an 80 percent threshold is adopted for purposes of the proposed
reform). As a result, Lower Tier Partnership would be precluded from specially
allocating income between P1 and P2.
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proposed reforms would still serve a valuable purpose-they ensure that
related taxpayers cannot achieve results through partnerships that they could
not achieve outside the partnerships. Indeed, proponents of special
allocations frequently defend them by arguing that special allocations merely
allow partners to bring about results, through a partnership, that they could
attain otherwise.
1. Related Partners Simply Hold Assets Differently
In the PTP example, the parties might restructure their arrangement
so that the Blocker directly owns a 100 percent interest in any asset that
generates nonqualifying income and the Exempt PTP Parent directly owns a
100 percent interest in any asset that generates qualifying income. This new
structure obviates the need to use partnerships and special allocations to
subject the qualifying income to only a single level of tax.
This predictable taxpayer response, however, does not involve abuse
of the partnership tax allocation rules. Taxpayers who are able to respond in
this way are not, under current law, engaging in the type of partnership
abuse at which the proposal is aimed because they are simply accomplishing
something through a partnership that they could achieve without a
partnership. Thus, consistent with one of the justifications for allowing
special allocations, these taxpayers are merely using such allocations to bring
about results, through a partnership, that they could have attained
69
otherwise.
67. See Mark P. Gergen, Subchapter K and Passive Financial
Intermediation, 51 SMU L. REv. 37, 66 (1997) ("[W]e suspect a result is wrong
when a partnership is used to circumvent tax rules contained outside Subchapter K or
to achieve tax results that could not be achieved were the same thing done not using
a partnership entity . . . . Subchapter K is particularly susceptible to the argument
that it should not be used to circumvent other tax rules because its rules are often
justified on the ground that they enable people to do through a partnership what they
could also do outside of a partnership. For example, the rule allowing special
allocations was originally justified in this way. . . .").
68. Even under current law, if an asset generates entirely nonqualifying
income, a blocker might own that asset in its entirety rather than through a
partnership. For instance, in the case of an Exempt PTP that is entitled to share in
income earned by a private equity firm, a blocker might own the right to receive
management fees from the funds that the private equity firm sponsors. However, the
right to receive carried interest from any given fund sponsored by the private equity
firm is an asset that potentially generates some qualifying income and some
nonqualifying income and therefore cannot be owned entirely by the Exempt PTP or
a blocker.
69. See supra note 67 and accompanying text for discussion of this
justification for special allocations.
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However, this sort of restructuring may not be feasible in some
situations. In particular, a partnership may hold a single asset that generates
different tax items, and the partnership could allocate some tax items to some
partners while allocating other tax items to other, related partners to achieve
results that would be difficult to replicate outside of the partnership context.
For example, if an Exempt PTP acquires an asset that may generate
substantial amounts of both qualifying income and nonqualifying income,
partnership allocations are necessary to achieve the desired tax result of
exempting the qualifying income from corporate tax. Without the ability to
use a partnership and special allocations, the blocker corporation likely
would have to own this asset entirely and earn all of the income generated by
it. Doing so would protect the Exempt PTP from earning excessive amounts
of nonqualifying income to ensure its status as an Exempt PTP. However,
this structure subjects all income generated by the asset (even qualifying
income) to the entity-level tax imposed upon the blocker corporation. Under
current law, a partnership and special allocations can be used to achieve a
much better result, where only the nonqualifying income will be subject to
entity-level tax. The proposed reform would put an end to the taxpayers'
ability to use partnership allocations to achieve this improved result.70
To illustrate, consider an Exempt PTP that owns and operates a
casino for a period of time after which it sells the casino, recognizing a gain.
Income from operating the casino is nonqualifying income, while gain
70. For similar discussion in the context of proposals to prevent special
allocations generally, see Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K, supra note 19, at 9("Outside a partnership, A and B could accomplish the same thing if A purchased
tax-exempt bonds and B purchased taxable bonds. To prohibit the special allocation
penalizes A and B for owning the assets through a partnership. Character shifting
allocations really pose a problem akin to that posed by disguised sales. The problem
is that partners may use special allocations to exchange interests in assets without
recognition of gain or loss."); Id. at 34-35 (discussing the fact that the results of
some special allocations could be achieved by placing assets in different
partnerships); Hasen, Allocations Revisited, supra note 62, at 383 ("As long as the
partners carry through the consequences of the altered sharing consistently, there
should be no problem of improper assignment. Consider that, instead of a special
allocation, the partners in many cases could have established a separate partnership
that owned just the assets for which a different sharing arrangement was desired and
effectuated through a special allocation. If allocations in that separate partnership
tracked the capital account balances or, more generally, the PIP in that partnership,
there would be no special allocation. Accordingly, the provision of special rules that
permit varying ownership ratios of specific items of partnership property in a single
partnership ought to not pose a problem as long as the ownership ratios are respected
all the way down."); Id. at 384-85 ("In general, a special allocation creates
assignment problems because it allocates part but not all aspects of ownership of a
partnership item to the partners in a ratio that differs from the general sharing
ratio.").
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recognized upon sale of the casino, to the extent that it is attributable to real
estate, is qualifying income.71 As long as related partners can utilize special
allocations, a partnership in which the Exempt PTP and a blocker were
partners could own the casino, and the partnership could allocate operating
income to the blocker while allocating gain attributable to the sale of real
estate directly to the Exempt PTP. If related partners could no longer benefit
from special allocations, the blocker might have to own and sell the casino,
and, as a result, all income generated by the casino would be subject to entity
level tax at the blocker level.72
2. Imitating Structures Used by REITs
Exempt PTPs are not the only entities operating beyond the confines
of their traditional scope yet still managing to reduce their corporate tax
burden. As the New York Times recently reported, many companies have
recently restructured themselves in order to qualify as real estate investment
trusts ("REITs") for tax purposes.73 If an entity qualifies as a REIT for tax
purposes, it can, like Exempt PTPs, avoid entity-level tax.74 In order to
qualify as a REIT, an entity must satisfy a number of tests, among which are
income tests that require the entity to earn predominantly income related to
real estate and certain types of investment income. Companies that earn
mainly income derived from real estate have long benefited from the special
tax regime applicable to REITs. The new-style REITs described by the Times
71. See I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1)(D).
72. One potential alternative structure would be unavailable to the Exempt
PTP because of a special rule that treats rent received from a related party as
nonqualifying income. In particular, the Exempt PTP could not own the casino and
lease it to the blocker in exchange for rental payments while the blocker operated the
casino, because rent received from a related taxpayer is treated as nonqualifying
income except in certain circumstances. I.R.C. section 7704(d) (3) (defining rent by
reference to section 856(d) with certain modifications); I.R.C. section 856(d)(2)(B)
(providing that rent excludes amounts received from related taxpayers except in
certain circumstances). Likewise, the blocker could not own the casino while it was
being operated as a casino and transfer the casino to the Exempt PTP prior to sale by
the Exempt PTP without the blocker recognizing any built-in gain in the casino that
existed at the time of the transfer. However, the Exempt PTP could own the casino
building and lease it to an unrelated party as discussed below. See infra Part
IV.C.2.b.
73. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, A Corporate Tax Break That's Closer to
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2014, at BUl. For earlier coverage, see, for example,
Nathanial Popper, Resytled as Real Estate Trusts, Varied Businesses Avoid Taxes,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2013, at Al.
74. REITs are entitled to a deduction for dividends paid to their
shareholders. I.R.C. section 857(b)(2)(B). As a result, by paying out all of its taxable
income as dividends, a REIT becomes effectively exempt from entity-level tax.
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differ from the traditional REITs in that they engage in businesses other than
traditional real estate investment and management. For example, some of
these new REITs own and operate prisons and some own casinos.
Unlike Exempt PTPs, however, REITs cannot employ a blocker
structure and use special allocations to ensure compliance with the applicable
income tests. This is because the REIT qualification rules effectively
disregard special allocations,75 much like our proposal. Yet, the new-style
REITs were successful in attaining REIT status, in part because the IRS has
issued private letter rulings broadly interpreting qualifying income to include
some non-traditional income 7 6 and also because they used other tax
structuring techniques. Accordingly, if our proposal were adopted, it can be
expected that at least some of the structures that currently use related-partner
allocations would be merely replaced by structures used by these new-style
REITs.
a. Why REITs Cannot Use Special Allocations
In order to qualify as a REIT, an entity must pass two income tests
and an asset test, in addition to complying with other requirements.n The
first income test provides that at least 75 percent of the entity's gross income
must consist of rent from real property, interest on obligations secured by
mortgages on real property or on interests in real property, and other
enumerated types of income related to real estate. The second income test
requires that the entity derive at least 95 percent of its gross income from
dividends, interest, rents from real property, and other specified types of
investment income. 9 An entity passes the asset test if at least 75 percent of
the value of its assets is represented by real estate assets, cash and cash items
(including receivables), and government securities.so
75. See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
76. For example, recently, the IRS has issued private letter rulings
concluding that amounts paid to use billboards were rent from real estate. See, e.g.,
P.L.R. 2011-430-11 (Oct. 28, 2011). Also, the IRS has issued a private letter ruling
concluding that when a REIT that owns a prison building grants to governmental
authorities the right to use the building to house inmates in exchange for a per diem
per inmate payment, the payment received by the REIT constitutes rent from real
property. See, e.g., P.L.R. 2013-20-007 (May 17, 2013). Furthermore, the IRS ruled
that a telecom company's transmission lines qualify as real estate assets. See, e.g.,
Telecom Firm Announces Latest Tax-Free REIT Spinoff Transaction, 2014 TAX
NOTES TODAY 146-1 (July 30, 2014).
77. For other requirements, see I.R.C. §§ 856-857.
78. I.R.C. § 856(c)(3).
79. I.R.C. § 856(c)(2).
80. I.R.C. § 856(c)(4)(A).
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If a REIT owns an interest in a partnership, Regulation section
1.856-3(g) provides that, for purposes of applying the income tests and asset
test, the REIT will be "deemed to own its proportionate share of each of the
assets of the partnership and will be deemed to be entitled to the income of
the partnership attributable to such share."81 The Regulation provides further
that a REIT's "proportionate share" will be determined based on the REIT's
capital interest in the partnership.82 In a number of private letter rulings, the
IRS has concluded that a REIT's capital interest in a partnership is
determined by dividing the REIT's capital account balance by the capital
account balances of all partners, assuming those capital accounts are
maintained in accordance with the economic effect rules.83
As a result of this regulation, a REIT could not use the structure
employed in the PTP example (illustrated above in Figure 2) to ensure
compliance with the REIT income tests. If a REIT did use such a structure
then, despite the fact that the partnership allocated only qualifying income to
the REIT and all nonqualifying income to a blocker, the REIT would
nevertheless be treated (for purposes of applying the income tests) as
recognizing nonqualifying income in an amount equal to the partnership's
total nonqualifying income multiplied by the REIT's capital interest in the
81. Reg. § 1.856-3(g). While it is clear that this rule applies for purposes of
determining a REIT's compliance with the income tests and asset tests, it is less clear
whether this rule applies more broadly, such as for purposes of determining the
REIT's taxable income. Some have concluded that it does not apply more broadly.
See, e.g., PETER M. FASS, MICHAEL E. SHAFF & DONALD B. ZIEF, REAL ESTATE
INVESTMENT TRUSTS HANDBOOK § 6:46 (2013) [hereinafter FASS ET AL., REIT
HANDBOOK] ("For purposes of calculating REIT taxable income, however, the
allocation rules of Sections 704(b) and (c), which are based on a capital account
analysis and not solely on a partner's capital interest, prevail. Thus, a special
allocation of income or loss may be made to the REIT, and section 704(c) rules, with
respect to contributed property to the REIT, apply to determine the REIT's taxable
income under section 857(b)."). However, others have noted that this issue may not
be entirely free from doubt. See, e.g., Robert J. Crnkovich, Mark C. Fisher & John
W. Cullins, Will IRS Threaten Current Tax Treatment ofREITs Owning Partnership
Interests?, 90 J. TAX'N 39, 39 (1999) ("Most tax advisors interpret [Regulation
section 1.856-3(g)] . . . as applicable only for purposes of Section 856 REIT testing.
They should be aware of an informal view held by attorneys in the IRS Office of
Chief Counsel that the Regulation's reach might not be limited to the REIT income
and asset tests of section 856, but could be applicable for all purposes of the Code . .
. , effectively overriding a number of well-established statutory and regulatory
provisions.").
82. Reg. § 1.856-3(g).
83. See, e.g., P.L.R. 1994-52-032 (Dec. 30, 1994); P.L.R. 2003-10-014
(Mar. 7, 2003). Furthermore, a REIT's capital interest in a lower-tier partnership is
determined by multiplying the REIT's capital interest in an upper-tier partnership by
the upper-tier partnership's capital interest in the lower tier partnership. Id.
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partnership.84 This result is similar, though not identical, to the result under
our proposal. One difference is that our proposal would allocate the
partnership's tax items based on the respective value of partnership interests,
while the REIT rule allocates the tax items based on the respective capital
accounts. Another difference is that the REIT rule apparently applies only for
purposes of qualifying the parent entity as a REIT and not for purposes of
calculating tax liability,85 while our proposal would apply broadly for all tax
86purposes.
Because the REIT rule regarding special allocations predates the
current partnership tax allocation rules, some practitioners have taken the
questionable position that special allocations that have substantial economic
effect will be respected for purposes of applying the REIT income tests.
Furthermore, lobbyists have urged the Treasury to modernize the REIT rule
to take into account changes to the partnership tax allocation rules that have
transpired since the REIT rule's adoption. If Treasury were to modernize
84. See, e.g., FASS ET AL., REIT HANDBOOK, supra note 81 ("[The rule in
Regulation section 1.856-3(g)] also strongly implies that if a REIT has a 25 percent
interest in a partnership which has $100 of rental income and $100 of service
income, any special allocation of the $100 service (nonqualifying) income to Non-
REIT partners is ignored, even though such allocation complies with all the
requirements under Section 704(b) and has substantial economic effect. The REIT
would be treated as receiving $25 of rental income and $25 of service income,
irrespective of any special allocations.").
85. For further discussion, see supra note 81.
86. There are a couple of additional differences. First, the existing
regulation in the REIT context applies even if the REIT is unrelated to the other
partner(s) in the partnership, while our proposal applies only to special allocations
among related partners. Second, while our proposal is motivated by concerns over
existing and potential future abuses, there is no indication that concern about abuse
motivated the existing regulation in the REIT context-the rule was adopted in 1962
along with the other REIT regulations, and the Treasury Decision contains no
explanation of the rationale for the rule. See T.D. 6598, 1962-1 C.B. 92.
87. See, e.g., FASS ET AL., REIT HANDBOOK, supra note 81, at § 5:48("Some practitioners have taken the position that allocations of partners' distributive
shares of income as set forth in the partnership's operating agreement, which have
substantial economic effect within the meaning of Reg. § 1.704-l(b)(2), result in a
proper calculation of qualified income for purposes of the 75 percent and 95 percent
gross income tests. Informal discussions with IRS personnel, however, indicate that
such an interpretation giving effect to special allocations for purposes of Section
1.856-3(g) would require a change in the regulations.").
88. A letter from the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts
(NAREIT) states: "First, we hope that the IRS will open a regulations project to
modernize Treasury Regulation section 1.856-3(g). As you know, this regulation
section acts as a crucial junction between the REIT and partnership tax rules.
However, the existing regulation does not reflect any of the fundamental changes
made to Subchapter K in the last few decades. This item was on the Business Plan
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the rule, it ought to do so cautiously-with the goal of not allowing REITs to
use special allocations for purposes of complying with the REIT income tests
at least when nonqualifying income is allocated to a partner related to the
REIT.
b. Alternative Structures Used by REITs
Despite the fact that REITs cannot use special allocations to ensure
compliance with the REIT income tests, REITs have still expanded beyond
their traditional scope. Traditionally, REITs were found exclusively in
businesses that produce almost entirely qualifying income. Recently,
however, other types of businesses have been using the REIT structure. For
example, a company that owns and operates prisons was restructured as a
REIT, as illustrated in Figure 5 below.
Figure 5
FREIT
Taxable REIT
Prison Building Subsidiary
In this structure, the REIT directly owns prison buildings and it
grants to government entities the right to use the prison buildings to house
inmates. 89 In exchange, the government entities pay the REIT a fee
calculated on a per day per inmate basis.90 In private letter rulings, the IRS
has ruled that this fee will be treated as rent from real property and,
therefore, is qualifying income for purposes of both REIT income tests.91 In
exchange for a fee paid by the government entities, the Taxable REIT
Subsidiary (the "TRS") provides various services such as security, food
for 1993, and NAREIT submitted a draft regulation to your office on October 17,
1994." See 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 199-28 (Oct. 12, 1995).
89. P.L.R. 2013-20-007 (May 17, 2013).
90. Id
91. See, e.g., P.L.R. 2013-20-007 (May 17, 2013).
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services for inmates, medical and dental care for inmates, and inmate
transportation.92 The TRS is taxed at an entity level on the income it earns,
but it can earn income that would be nonqualifying income if earned directly
by the REIT without jeopardizing the REIT's ability to pass the income tests.
In order to ensure compliance with the REIT qualification tests, the REIT's
interest in the TRS cannot exceed 25 percent of the value of the REIT's
assets.93
If special allocations among related partners were disallowed, an
Exempt PTP in a similar line of business could use the structure employed by
REITs. Furthermore, unlike a REIT that must ensure that the value of its
interest in the TRS does not exceed 25 percent of the value of its assets, an
Exempt PTP's interest in a taxable corporate subsidiary is not subject to any
such limitation.
Similarly, a REIT that owns casinos uses the structure shown in Figure 6
below.
Figure 6
_RE I Unrelated
=Non-REIT
Casino Building
In this structure, the REIT owns a casino building and leases the
building to a Non-REIT (an unrelated company). 94 The Non-REIT operates
the casino and pays the REIT rent that is in part fixed and in part based on
revenues earned from operating the casino. The rent received by the REIT is
qualifying income.95 Leasing the casino to an entity that is unrelated to the
92. Id. In some cases, the charge for services is not separately stated so the
government pays the entire amount to the REIT, and the REIT pays the TRS a fee
for providing the services. Id.
93. I.R.C. § 856(c)(4)(B)(ii).
94. This structure is similar to the structure used by Penn National Gaming
Inc. after engaging in a spin-off. For a description of the spin-off and the private
letter ruling obtained by Penn National Gaming Inc., see Robert Willens, Analyzing
Penn National Gaming's Groundbreaking IRS Ruling, 2013 TAx NOTES TODAY
239-10 (Dec. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Willens, Penn National Gaming's Ruling].
95. Rent from real property does not include an amount that depends on the
income or profit derived from property by any person; however, an amount will not
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REIT ensures that the payments under the lease are treated as rent for
purposes of the REIT income tests because amounts paid by lessees that are
related to a REIT are generally not treated as rent for purposes of applying
the income test.96
If special allocations among related parties were disallowed, an
Exempt PTP that owned a casino building could use a similar structure, and,
like a REIT, an Exempt PTP would have to be wary of leasing the casino to a
related entity.97
In summary, if special allocations among related partners were
disallowed, some entities that would not traditionally qualify as Exempt
PTPs could continue to engage in tax structuring techniques to achieve
Exempt PTP status. Nevertheless, the flaw in the existing partnership tax
allocation rules ought to be fixed for three reasons. First, in some cases, it
will not be feasible to restructure in a way that replicates the results achieved
through related-partner allocations. Second, the problem of related-partner
allocations extends beyond the Exempt PTP problem, as illustrated by the
CFC example. Finally, and most importantly, it can be expected that creative
tax planners will continue to find new ways to exploit the mismatch between
the underlying premises of the substantial economic effect test and the
economic realities of related-partner allocations.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the current set of intricate rules
governing partnership allocations have a critical blind spot: allocations
among related partners. These rules were clearly drafted without related-
partner allocations in mind because they rely on adverseness of economic
interests to deter abusive allocations. Because of this blind spot, related
parties can use partnerships to obtain tax benefits that they could not
otherwise achieve. While the IRS currently has a tool available to disallow
these tax benefits, namely the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule, this Article
be excluded from rent solely because it is based on a fixed percentage or percentages
of receipts or sales. I.R.C. section 856(d)(2)(A). Furthermore, Penn National Gaming
received a private letter ruling stating that the amount paid by the Non-REIT would
be treated as rent from real property. See Willens, Penn National Gaming's Ruling,
supra note 94; P.L.R. 2013-37-007 (Sept. 13, 2013).
96. See I.R.C. § 856(d)(2)(B) (setting forth the general rule that payments
from related persons are not treated as rent); I.R.C. § 856(d)(5) (providing that
constructive ownership rules will apply when determining whether a person is
related to a REIT); I.R.C. § 856(d)(8) (describing limited circumstances in which
amounts received from a related person can be treated as rent).
97. See I.R.C. § 7704(d)(3) (defining rent by reference to section 856(d)
with certain modifications); I.R.C. § 856(d)(2)(B) (providing that rent excludes
amounts received from related taxpayers except in certain circumstances).
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recommends that the section 704(b) regulations be amended to deal
specifically with related-partner allocations.
The regulations should provide that the substantial economic effect
safe harbor does not apply to related-partner allocations. Therefore, these
allocations must be made in accordance with the partners' interests in the
partnership. This would mean that allocations among related partners are
always made on a fully pro rata basis in accordance with the respective
values of the related partners' interests in the partnership. In short, special
allocations would be eliminated in the context of related partners.
The proposed reform would entail little, if any, additional
administrative burden on the related partners. And, given the significant
overlap of economic interests necessary to be characterized as related
partners, the reform would have no effect on legitimate, nontax uses of
special allocations.
That said, the proposed reform would be no panacea. While the
reform would provide significant friction against certain tax-motivated
transactions, in other situations it might cause the taxpayer merely to engage
in economically insignificant restructuring. While this is a concern for the
tax system generally, it is not a partnership tax concern.
While a full ventilation of this broader concern is left for another
day, it is worth noting that the critical issue appears to be whether the tax
system should, in the context of publicly traded entities (1) always tax
qualifying income at the entity level, (2) never tax qualifying income at the
entity level, or (3) sometimes tax qualifying income at the entity level
depending on the amount of qualifying income earned by the entity-a factor
that is sometimes within the entity's control if it avails itself of sophisticated
tax planning. Our current system can be described as using the third
approach, which seems to be the worst of the three options.
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